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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONA R. BULLOCK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HERBERT JOHN UNGRICHT, 
et a!., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff/Appellant, Dona 
R. Bullock, against the Defendants/Respondents, Her-
bert John Ungricht and Barbara R. Ungricht, for in-
juries and damages which she claims to have sustained 
as the result of an automobile accident. 
The parties will be referred to herein as they ap-
pear in the lower court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial of the case was held on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd 
and 4th days of April, 1974, in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft 
Case No. 
12806 
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with a jury. On April 4, 1974 the jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the defendants and against the plain-
tiff, no cause of action, and a Judgment on the Verdict 
was entered thereon. 
The plaintiff made a Motion for a New Trial or in 
the Alternative for a Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, which Motions were denied on April 18, 1974. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants seek to have the Order of the Dis-
trict Court denying the plaintiff's Motion for a New 
Trial affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of an automobile accident 
which occurred on December 16, 1971 at 1435 East on 
33rd South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah at approxi-
mately 9:30 p.m. (R. 246-249) 
The plaintiff's version of the accident was that she 
made a left-hand turn onto 33rd South Street and had 
planned on turning into the driveway just East of the 
apartment house located at 1435 East on that street. 
She claims to have activated her signal light indicating 
her intention to turn into the driveway at least 150 feet 
from the point where the accident occurred, but was 
unable to complete the turn because of cars which had 
backed up waiting for the red light at the intersection. 
She indicates she had been stopped for some time with 
her signal light operating when her automobile was 
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struck from the rear, knocking it into the two westbound 
lanes of traffic. (R. 251-254) 
The testimony of the defendants Barbara R. Ung-
richt and Herbert John Ungricht was to the effect that 
after they had made a left-hand turn onto 33rd South 
Street from Highland Drive, they noticed the plaintiff's 
automobile which appeared to be moving erratically in 
that it seemed to slow down and then accelerate. At 
this point the defendant Herbert John Ungricht slowed 
his car until he could determine what plaintiff's auto-
mobile was going to do. They indicate there were no 
cars in the westbound lanes which would have precluded 
plaintiff from making a left-hand turn, however, not-
withstanding this, she brought her automobile to an 
abrupt stop. There was no signal from the plaintiff's 
automobile indicating she was intending to stop and the 
left-turn signal was not activated until her automobile 
was in the process of stopping abruptly. The defend-
ant Herbert John Ungricht applied his brakes but was 
unable to avoid the accident. (R. 623-643 and D. of 
Herbert John Ungricht 12-15, 30 & 39) Additionally, 
there was evidence from the investigating officers that 
the roadway was covered with "black ice." (R. 581, 608) 
In addition to the claim for general damages, the 
plaintiff sought damages for income she claimed to have 
lost. (R. 185) In support of this claim, she had given 
testimony on direct examination and had called sev-
eral business associates as witnesses who testified ex-
tensively concerning her sales and other business abil-
ities. (R. 296-309, 363, 367-373) 
3 
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In view of the substantial claim for lost income 
which had been asserted by the plaintiff and the num-
ber of witnesses she had called concerning her bus-
iness acumen and sales ability, questions were asked 
of her on cross examination concerning the history of 
her business and sales activities. Plaintiff conceded 
that prior to becoming involved with Utah American 
Corporation she was a sales distributor for the Inch 
Master Company from 1969 until the end of 1970 and 
that this was not a successful business venture and had 
resulted in the filing of a Petition in Bankruptcy by her 
in April of 1971. (B. 395) 
This evidence was introduced in rebuttal to the 
claim being made by the plaintiff for loss of income 
and was admitted by the Court as being relevant to 
that issue. (B. 429) 
In support of the plaintiff's claim for general dam-
ages, considerable medical testimony had been intro-
duced by her. Included in this evidence was testimony 
from one of her physicians, Donald C. Bernson, M.D., 
to the effect that the plaintiff's financial and emotional 
problems were the cause of her continued complaints. 
(B. 354, 355) In view of the foregoing, additional ques-
tions were asked of the plaintiff on cross examination 
concerning the emotional impact of the bankruptcy peti-
tion and the fact that two judgments entered against her 
in that proceeding were still outstanding. (B. 396) The 
plaintiff said the judgments had not been paid but 
denied that this caused her any concern. (B. 397) 
4 
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The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgments from the Bankruptcy Court (proposed Ex-
hibit #12-D) showed, in addition to the fact that the 
judgments had not been satisfied, that the same had 
been obtained by the use of misrepresentations on the 
part of the plaintiff. This evidence was proffered to 
the Court on the grounds that it not only related to 
the credibility of the plaintiff, but was the cause of the 
complaints which she continued to assert. At this time 
counsel for plaintiff advised the Court that he may 
wish to make further inquiry of the plaintiff concern-
ing the reasons for the filing of the Petition in Bank-
ruptcy by her, but conceded that he did not know what 
this would show. In view of this, the Court advised 
him that if this matter were opened up on direct ex-
amination, he "probably" would allow proposed Ex-
hibit #12-D to come in. (R. 434) No further inquiry 
was made concerning this subject and the Court ruled 
that the exhibit would not be received. (R. 488) 
The Court denied Motions for a Directed Verdict 
made by the plaintiff and defendants and held that 
questions of negligence and contributory negligence 
were for the jury because of conflicts which existed 
in the testimony of the facts surrounding the accident. 
(R. 655) The Court instructed the jury on the claims 
of the parties concerning the allegations of negligence 
and contributory negligence and the claim for damages. 
(R. 84-97) The case was submitted to the jury and 
they returned a verdict in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiff, no cause of action. (R. 31) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER 
COURT ARE PRESUMED BY THE RE-
VIEWING COURT ON APPEAL TO BE 
CORRECT. 
There are numerous cases from the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah, as well as other jurisdictions, 
supporting the general proposition of the law stated in 
Point I and no cases have been found by defendants 
stating a contrary position. 
There is not only a presumption of validity on ap-
peal of the proceedings in the lower court, but the 
burden is on the plaintiff affirmatively to demonstrate 
error, and in the absence of such, the judgment must 
be affirmed by the reviewing court. Leithead v. Adair, 
10 Utah 2d 282, 351 P.2d 956; Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 
2d 381, 275 P.2d 680. Not only are the pre-judgment 
proceedings in the trial court presumed to be correct, 
but every reasonable contendment must be indulged in 
by the appellate court in favor of it. Burton v. Z.C.M.L, 
122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 516; Nagle v. Club Fontainbleu, 
17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d 346; Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 
17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30. 
The proposition of law set forth in Point I is bind-
ing upon the appellate court whether the case was tried 
before a judge only or to a judge sitting with a jury. 
However, the presumption in favor of validity has more 
weight when the trial court has given its approval to 
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the determination of the jury as set forth in its verdict 
by refusing to grant a new trial or a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict to the losing party. See Gordon 
v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430. It has also 
been held that where a jury trial has been had and a 
Motion for New Trial denied to the losing party, the 
presumptions are in favor of the judgment entered and 
the Supreme Court will not disturb that judgment un-
less the appellant meets the burden of showing error 
and prejudice which deprived it of a fair trial. Lemmon 
v. Denver and Rio Grande Western RR, 9 Utah 2d 195, 
341 P.2d 215. 
In the case of Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 
24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399, the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah reiterated the long standing rule of the 
presumption in favor of the validity of the proceedings 
in the trial court and stated as follows: 
"The parties have had a full and fair opportun-
ity to present their evidence and arguments upon 
the issues to the court and the jury, who after 
due consideration and deliberation have made 
their determinations thereon. This is the ob-
jective of a trial. When it has been accomplished 
the administering of evenhanded justice to both 
sides demands that there should be some soli-
darity in the result so that it can be relied upon. 
Accordingly, the established rule is that all pre-
sumptions favor the validity of the verdict and 
judgment; and they will not be overturned un-
less the attacker shows that there is error which 
is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its ab-
sence the result would have been different. . . . " 
[Emphasis added] 
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See also Wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P.2d 
485; Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822; 
and Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUB-
MITTED THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE 
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO 
THE JURY. 
As was noted in the Statement of Facts, there is 
a sharp conflict in the evidence as to the facts sur-
rounding the accident. The plaintiff testified that after 
she had made her left turn onto 33rd South street, she 
activated her signal light for a left-hand turn indicat-
ing her intention to turn into the driveway at 1435 
East 33rd South. That when she came even with the 
driveway she stopped in the inside lane of traffic and 
had been in this position for some time waiting for 
the traffic to clear which she claims was backed up 
from the stop light at the intersection of 33rd South 
and Highland Drive and prevented her from complet-
ing her turn. That while waiting in this position, her 
automobile was struck from the rear which knocked 
it into the two westbound lanes of traffic on 33rd South 
street. (R, 251-254) 
The testimony of the defendant Herbert John Un-
gricht was to the effect that after he had completed 
his left-hand turn from Highland Drive onto 33rd 
South street, he observed the plaintiff's automobile 
ahead of him traveling at approximately the same speed 
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as his automobile and then noticed some erratic be-
havior on its part in that it appeared to slow and then 
accelerated. He then slowed the speed of his automo-
bile until he could determine what movement plaintiff's 
automobile was going to make. At this point the plain-
tiff's automobile appeared to suddenly start to make 
a left-hand turn and then stopped abruptly. There was 
no signal from the plaintiff's automobile that it was 
going to stop and the left-turn signal was not activated 
until it was stopped or in the process of stopping sharply. 
(D. of Herbert John Ungricht 15, 29, 30, 33) 
The defendant Barbara B. Ungricht states she saw 
the plaintiff's automobile after their automobile had 
completed its left-hand turn and was eastbound on 33rd 
South. She noticed the automobile making some er-
ratic movements in going slowly and then accelerating 
and she made an exclamation to that effect. The plain-
tiff's automobile then accelerated slightly and started 
to make a left-hand turn, slammed on its brakes and 
stopped quickly. (E. 623) She clearly states that there 
was no signal from the plaintiff's automobile indicat-
ing it would stop and/or attempt to make a left-hand 
turn, and that she was looking for such a signal. (E. 630, 
633,634,635) 
The testimony of Herbert Pine Ungricht is sub-
stantially in accordance with that of the two defend-
ants. At the time of the accident he was seated facing 
toward the rear in the third seat of a station wagon when 
he heard his wife make the exclamation concerning the er-
ratic driving of the plaintiff's automobile. This caused 
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him to turn his attention toward the front of the auto-
mobile and he observed the plaintiff's automobile trav-
eling East and then it suddenly stopped with its front 
end several feet across the center line. He observed 
no signal from the automobile indicating that it was 
intending to stop and/or make a left-hand turn. (D. 
of Herbert Pine Ungricht 6, 8, 13) 
Even though the defendant Herbert John Ungricht 
testified that the street appeared dry (D. of Herbert 
John Ungricht 8) both Deputy Sheriff Bernard Anje-
wierden of the iSalt Lake County Sheriff's Department 
and Trooper Eobert Van leperen of the Utah Highway 
Patrol, who investigated the accident, testified that the 
road was slippery with what was described as " black 
ice." (R. 581, 608) 
It is the contention of the defendants that based 
upon the conflicting testimony concerning the facts sur-
rounding the accident, the issues of negligence and con-
tributory negligence were properly submitted to the 
jury and it could have reasonably found that the de-
fendants were free from negligence and/or that the 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. In this 
regard the trial court stated as follows: 
"I think both, with respect to the question of 
negligence of the defendant driver or the ques-
tion of contributory negligence, that I think it 
is clear from the evidence that there is a conflict 
in the evidence and when that condition exists 
with respect, as I believe it does to both of these 
questions, our Supreme Court has clearly stated 
that it is a jury question and as so I will deny 
10 
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the motion and let the jury decide both the is-
sues.'? (B. 655) 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has re-
peatedly stated that where a conflict in the evidence 
exists, it is proper to submit the disputed issue to the 
jury and it would be error if the trial judge failed to 
do so. In the case of Jensen v. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 
271 P.2d 838, the Court affirmed the ruling of the trial 
court in submitting the issues of negligence and con-
tributory negligence to the jury and stated as follows: 
" . . . The trial court properly submitted to the 
jury the questions of negligence, contributory 
negligence and proximate cause, which this court 
has held are ordinarily jury questions." 
In the case of Best v. Ruler, 3 Utah 2d 177, 281 
P.2d 208, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah am-
plified the proposition of law set forth herein and stated 
as follows: 
" I t has been frequently announced by this court 
that negligence is a question for the jury unless 
all reasonable men must draw the same conclu-
sion from the facts as they are shown. Shafer 
v. Kelley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah 46, 234 P. 300, 
38 A.L.E. 1523; Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 
91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am.8t.Rep. 708; Baker v. 
Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P.2d 679. As was said 
in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 Utah 134, 58 
P. 355, 358: 
i
 "Where there is uncertainty as to the ex-
istence of either negligence or contributory 
negligence, the question is not one of law, 
but of fact, and to be settled by a jury; and 
this whether, the uncertainty arises from a 
11 
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conflict in the testimony, or because, the 
facts being undisputed, fair-minded men will 
honestly draw different conclusions from 
t h e m . " " ' 
For other cases supporting the foregoing proposition, 
see Hay den v. Cederlund, 1 Utah 2d 171, 263 P.2d 796; 
Gibbs v. Blue Cab, (Utah) 249 P.2d 213, on rehearing 
259 P.2d 294; and Etvan v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272, 
399 P.2d 210. 
It is significant to note that the plaintiff did not 
except to the instructions of the trial court concerning 
the issues of negligence and contributory negligence 
and does not raise any claim of error in connection with 
the same on appeal. (B. 659) 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AL-
LOWED THE INTRODUCTION OF EVI-
DENCE CONCERNING THE PETITION IN 
BANKRUPTCY FILED BY THE PLAIN-
TIFF. 
The entire thrust of the appeal of the plaintiff is 
to the effect that evidence concerning the fact that the 
plaintiff had filed a Petition in Bankruptcy approxi-
mately eight months prior to the accident in question 
was improper and prejudicial. This appears to be 
based upon the premise that the mere filing of a Peti-
tion in Bankruptcy casts dispersions upon the integ-
rity and credibility of the plaintiff, which resulted in 
the jury being prejudiced against her. 
12 
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In order to determine the relevancy of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding a review of the proceedings at the 
trial must be made. The plaintiff had asserted a claim 
for loss of income from the Utah American Corpora-
tion of $1,000.00 per month. This corporation was 
formed in approximately November of 1971 and was 
engaged in the sale of an exercise device known as the 
"Inch Master", as well as hosiery. (E. 219) In sup-
port of this claim the plaintiff had testified concern-
ing her sales abilities and had produced other witnesses 
concerning this aspect of her claim, to wit: Bruce Egan 
who had worked part time for the Inch Master Com-
pany as had the plaintiff (E. 362, 363); Herbert W. 
DeVitt, Jr., who was a business associate of the plain-
tiff in Utah American Corporation in which venture he 
had engaged because of plaintiff's business judgment 
and ability (E. 367-373); and Eoger Stewart who was 
also a business associate of plaintiff in Utah American 
Corporation and who also felt the failure of this bus-
iness entity was because of the plaintiff's inability to 
operate the same (E. 296-309). 
In view of the substantial claim which was being 
made by the plaintiff for loss of income and the num-
ber of witnesses she had called in attempting to 
prove this claim by showing her sales and other bus-
iness abilities, the defendants sought to rebut this by 
the introduction of evidence which would show that con-
trary to plaintiff's assertion, she had a history of bus-
iness failures as opposed to successes. 
13 
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Plaintiff conceded that prior to becoming involved 
with Utah American Corporation she was engaged in 
substantially the same type of business for the Inch 
Master Company from 1969 until the end of 1970 as a 
sales distributor and that this was not a successful 
business venture and had resulted in the filing of a 
Petition in Bankruptcy by her in April of 1971. (B. 395) 
After the plaintiff had answered a question concerning 
the bankruptcy proceeding, her counsel objected to the 
introduction of the evidence as being "irrelevant, in-
competent and immaterial." The Court properly ex-
ercised its discretion concerning the evidence and over-
ruled the plaintiff's objection to the same. 
It is clear that the Court gave careful considera-
tion to the introduction of the evidence and felt that 
the same was material and relevant in view of the plain-
tiff's claim for loss of income and stated as follows: 
"Now, it certainly seems to me that when she 
puts on all of these witnesses who testify about 
her sales ability and the fact that was going to 
be such a big success and she is going to make 
a thousand dollars a month income, the proof 
she in fact just nine months before, while oper-
ating a similar type of business activity, ended 
up in the Bankruptcy Court, I think is very ma-
terial and relevant evidence concerning a re-
buttal of the claims made by her witnesses that 
have been testifying in this trial. 
# * # 
"Now, however, I don't agree with your con-
tention that the probative value of this infor-
mation about her bankruptcy is substantially out-
weighed by the risk that it might have with re-
14 
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spect to undue consumption of time, creation of 
a substantial danger of prejudice or to consti-
tute any element of surprise. I don't see how 
she can claim prejudice with respect to this sort 
of testimony when she has presented her four 
or five witnesses, including herself on this very 
point. And, therefore, I don't think that in any 
sense of the word, the discretion provided for 
in Eule 45 is to be exercised by me in this case 
because I think clearly that it is material and 
relevant to the issues involved." 
The foregoing ruling of the Court is patently correct 
and in this regard 22 Am.Jur. 2d, Damages, Sections 
315 and 317 provide in part as follows: 
"Generally, the plaintiff may put in evidence 
his actual earnings for a reasonable period be-
fore the injury and his actual earnings, if any, 
after the injury. This is true whether his earn-
ings were in the form of wages or salary, com-
missions, or profits. . . . Such evidence is ad-
missible not because it is the amount to which 
plaintiff is entitled, but rather, because it is 
evidence of plaintiff's earning ability. . . . On 
the other hand, if for any particular reason the 
plaintiff would not have earned any wages had 
he not been injured, this fact may be shown in 
diminution of the damages. 
" . . . as a general rule, where a claim is made 
for loss of wages, impairment of earning ca-
pacity, or loss of future earnings, facts may be 
shown concerning the plaintiff's habits or con-
duct which might throw light on the probability 
of his securing employment, such as his business 
and other habits, including his habits of econ-
omy." [Emphasis added] 
15 
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In the instant action it is clear that the plaintiff's bus-
iness failure which had resulted in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding filed by her wras relevant and material to the 
claim being asserted by her and she can scarcely now 
claim that the admission of this fact unduly prejudiced 
her. 
In addition to the claim for loss of income the plain-
tiff had asserted a claim for general damages for the 
injuries which she claimed to have sustained in the ac-
cident. However, there was substantial evidence to the 
effect that at least a portion of the complaints which 
were being made by the plaintiff were not accident re-
lated and were caused as a result of the emotional 
upset from which she was suffering which resulted from 
family and financial problems. In this regard, Donald 
C. Bernson, M.D., one of the physicians who had treated 
the plaintiff and whom she had called at the trial con-
ceded that he could find nothing wrong with the plain-
tiff in 1973 and the records from the Cottonwood Hos-
pital, Salt Lake County, Utah which were prepared by 
him, provided as follows: 
" . . . It was subsequently noted there had been 
a great deal of emotional and financial problems 
present recently in patient's home life, especially 
back about the time of the present symptoms 
began. After exhausting all avenues of investi-
gation, the findings, et cetera, were discussed in 
detail with the patient and attempts were made 
to assure her that no serious or abnormal condi-
tion existed and she was discharged from the 
hospital on her sixth day. 
# * * 
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" Primary diagnosis — Cause of Admission — 
I diagnosed her as ' anxiety reaction with psycho-
physical neuromuscular reaction.' " (R. 354, 355) 
In connection with the bankruptcy proceeding, two 
creditors of the plaintiff had filed suit against her 
claiming she had incurred obligations to them based 
upon misrepresentations which she had made. The Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment from 
the Bankruptcy Court were included in proposed Ex-
hibit 12-D which was submitted to the Court. (R. 412) 
This evidence was proffered to the Court on the grounds 
that it not only related to the credibility of the plain-
tiff but was the cause of the complaints which she con-
tinued to assert. (R. 415) It would seem obvious that 
a judgment obtained against a person based on mis-
representations on her part which remained unsatisfied 
even as of the time of trial, would very likely be emo-
tionally upsetting to that person and in this instance 
the plaintiff's own physician had conceded that in his 
judgment such emotional upsets were the probable cause 
of the complaints which she continued to assert. 
At this point counsel for the plaintiff indicated 
that he wished to go into the reasons behind the fact 
that the plaintiff filed the Petition in Bankruptcy, but 
conceded he did not know what this would show. (R. 431) 
The Court advised him that if he wanted to go into 
the matter of the bankruptcy further, he would " prob-
ably" allow proposed Exhibit 12-D to be received. (R. 
434) No further inquiry was made concerning the bank-
ruptcy and the exhibit was not received. (R. 488) 
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Even if the Court had received proposed Exhibit 
12-D, it would not have been improper. In this regard, 
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in part 
as follows: 
"'. . . (c) evidence of traits of his character 
other than truth, honesty, or integrity or their 
opposites, shall be inadmissable; (d) evidence 
of specific instances of his conduct relevant only 
as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall 
be inadmissible." [Emphasis added] 
As was noted above, the proposed Exhibit 12-D 
was sougfht to be introduced not only to test the plain-
tiff's credibility, but on the issue of the complaints 
which she continued to assert which her own physician 
had testified were caused in part by the financial prob-
lems she had experienced and was continuing to ex-
perience. Thus, even if its introduction had been pre-
cluded on the claim of credibility, it would not have 
been barred under the provisions of Rule 22 because of 
its relevance in connection with the claim for damages. 
Notwithstanding the position of the defendants that 
proposed Exhibit 12-D could have been properly re-
ceived, the position of the plaintiff concerning the same 
is rendered moot in view of the Court's ruling that the 
exhibit should not be received. (R. 487, 488) 
It should also be noted that plaintiff's contention 
that the Petition in Bankruptcy somehow stigmatized 
or prejudiced her in the eyes of the jury is completely 
without factual or legal foundation. The record is com-
pletely void of any inference by the Court that it con-
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sidered bankruptcy as a "dirty word" as alleged by 
plaintiff in her Brief. To imply that the Court in this 
case viewed the fact that plaintiff had filed a Petition 
in Bankruptcy in and of itself as impuning her integ-
rity or would cause one to question her credibility is en-
tirely unwarranted and not supported by the record. 
Likewise, the record is completely void of any state-
ment by the Court or argument by counsel to the jury 
that the fact that the plaintiff had filed a Petition in 
Bankruptcy should cause them to question her credi-
bility. Conversely, the Court instructed the jury that 
they were to be entirely impartial in their deliberations 
and Instruction No. 1 provides in part as follows: 
"The law forbids you to let sentiment, sym-
pathy or prejudice influence you in your delib-
erations. Each party expects that you will con-
scientiously and dispassionately consider and 
weigh the evidence and apply the law of the 
case thereto, and that you will reach a just ver-
dict, regardless of what the consequences of such 
verdict may be." (R. 75) 
The plaintiff, in her Brief on appeal, cites no cases 
in support of the proposition espoused by her that the 
introduction of evidence of a Petition in Bankruptcy 
filed by a party would in any way be harmful or could 
conceivably constitute prejudicial error. All of the 
cases cited by plaintiff in her Brief differ with mat-
ters widely different from a bankruptcy proceeding such 
as: the homosexual tendency of a party in United States 
v. John David Provoo, (2d Cir. 1954) 215 F.2d 531; 
the automobile thefts which had been perpetrated by 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the plaintiff in Warren v. Hynes, (Wash. 1940) 102 
P,2d 691; the arrest record for disorderly conduct of 
a party in Sanford v. United States, 69 App. D.C. 44, 
98 F.2d 325 (1938); the evidence of the communist af-
filations of a party in Commomvealth v. Truitt, 39 Pa. 
72, 85 A.2d 425, 30 A.L.R. 2d 572; the arrest of the 
defendant for lewd conduct in People v. Hurlburt, 166 
Cal. App. 2d 334, 33 P.2d 82, 85 A.L.R.2d 500; the 
arrest record of a party for assault in Hockaday v. 
Redline, Inc., 85 U.S. App. D. C. 1, 174 F. 2d 154; the 
conviction of a party in a false bomb threat in Smith 
v. United States, (6th Cir. 1960) 283 F.2d 16; and the 
fact that parties had engaged in illegal gambling on 
the night of the accident in Champion v. Brooks Trans-
portation Co., 11 U.S. App. D.C. 293, 135 F.2d 652. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
As set forth herein, it is the position of the de-
fendants that no error was committed by the trial 
court, however, if any such error was committed, it 
was not prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
It is clearly the law of this state that the granting 
or denying of a Motion for New Trial is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the court and the trial court 
will be presumed to have acted properly unless the con-
trary can clearly be shown. Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Moyle, 
4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867. 
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I t is also clear that even though the trial court 
and/or the appellate court may have ruled differently 
had they been the trier of fact in the case, a jury ver-
dict may not be set aside on this basis as it would be 
the usurpation of the constitutional right of trial by 
jury. Uptown Appliance v. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 
P.2d 826. 
The case of Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 
409 P.2d 121, involved an action for personal injuries 
arising out of an automobile accident and the issue of 
liability insurance was injected into the trial. In af-
firming the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff and 
the ruling of the trial court in denying the Motion for 
a New Trial, the Supreme Court addressed itself to 
the discretionary functions of the trial court and stated 
as follows: 
" . . . It is the responsibility of the trial court 
to rule upon questions which arise concerning 
whether any such occurrence has prevented a 
party from having a fair t r ial ; and to take what-
ever corrective measure he deems necessary, in-
cluding the granting of a mistrial where that is 
required. Due to the fact that this is primarily 
his responsibility; and that he is in a position 
of advantage to observe the appearance, de-
meanor and reactions of all persons concerned, 
and the result which eventuates, his rulings on 
such matters should be looked upon with indul-
gence and should not be disturbed unless it clearly 
appears that he has abused his discretion.' ' 
The Court indicated that even though the injection of 
the issue of liability insurance into the trial was im-
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proper, it did not prevent the parties from having a 
fair trial. See also Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 
8, 354 P.2d 564. 
It should be noted that in this instance plaintiff 
sought to bolster her Motion for a New Trial by an Affi-
davit from her counsel concerning conversations which 
he had had with two of the jurors who told him they 
had discussed the plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding in 
their deliberations. This Affidavit was clearly improper 
and the Court properly declined to consider the same 
and entered an Order to this effect in denying the 
Motion for a New Trial. (R. 20) For cases supporting 
the proposition that Affidavits such as this which go 
into the deliberations of the jury are improper, see 
Wheat v. Denver & Rio Grande Western RR, 122 Utah 
418, 250 P.2d 938; Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah 2d 240, 
408 P.2d 709 and Hathaway v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33, 
439P.2d850. 
In this case the parties have had an opportunity 
to present their cases to the Court and the jury found 
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff 
on conflicting evidence and the Court declined to upset 
the verdict of the jury. In view of the foregoing, it 
seems that the following much quoted proposition is 
applicable: 
"Anyone acquainted with the practical opera-
tion of a trial by jury and the human factors 
that must play a part therein is aware that it; 
would be almost impossible to complete a trial 
of any length without some things occurring with 
which counsel, after the case is lost, can find 
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fault and, in zeal for his cause, all quite in good 
faith, magnify into error which to him and the 
losing parties seems blameable for their failure 
to prevail. However, from the standpoint of ad-
ministering evenhanded justice the court must 
dispassionately survey such claims against the 
over-all picture of the trial, and if the parties 
have been afforded an opportunity to fully and 
fairly present their evidence and arguments upon 
the issues, and the jury has made its determina-
tion thereon, the objective of the proceeding has 
been accomplished. And the judgment should 
not be disturbed unless it is shown that there is 
error which is substantial and prejudicial in the 
sense that it appears that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been dif-
ferent in the absence of such error. . . . " Hales 
v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant action conflicting evidence existed 
concerning the facts surrounding the accident giving 
rise to the plaintiff's claim for damages and in view of 
this the Court properly submitted the questions of neg-
ligence and contributory negligence to the jury. The 
jurors, as the finders of fact, saw all of the witnesses, 
heard their testimony, considered their demeanor and 
made a determination on the weight to give each wit-
ness and his testimony and after considering all, found 
for the defendants and against the plaintiff on this issue. 
The plaintiff asserted a substantial claim for loss 
of income and produced several witnesses in support 
of this claim who testified extensively concerning her 
business abilities. In light of this claim, the defendants 
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properly produced evidence concerning the fact that the 
plaintiff's business acumen and sales ability were not 
as she contended them to be as shown by her business 
failure just shortly prior to the accident in question 
which had resulted in the bankruptcy proceedings. Such 
evidence was clearly relevant and material in view of 
the claim for loss of earnings which had been asserted. 
The contention of the plaintiff that the fact that 
she had filed a Petition in Bankruptcy prejudiced her 
in the eyes of the jury is without any factual or legal 
support, and its probative value was clearly weighed 
by the Court at the time the same was introduced and 
thereafter in denying the plaintiff's Motion for a New 
Trial. 
Based upon the foregoing, defendants urge this 
Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court based 
upon the jury verdict and its Order denying plaintiff's 
Motion for a New Trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. Anthony Eyre 
Kipp and Christian 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants/-
Respondents 
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